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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF. THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STI.TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
17513 
LEONARD LIPSKY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NJl.TURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was originally charged with violation 
of§ 76-5-103(b) of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
The information alleged that on or about the 16th day of 
October, 1978, he committed an assravated assault upon the 
?erson of one Laurie Bacastow by attempting, with unlawful 
force or violence, to to bodily injury to Miss Bacastow by 
such means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
i~J~r:· ~o Miss Bacasto~. 
DISPOSITION I~~ THE LO\vER COURT 
The appellant was arraigned on November 3, 1978, 
and pleaded not guilty to the charge against him. However, 
at the time set for trial, on Novenber 14, 1978, he changed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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his plea to guilty as charged, which plea was accepted by 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, presiding in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah. Following a series of events which eventual! 
led to this appeal, appellant was sentenced to one to five 
years in the State Penitentiary on August 29, 1980, by the 
Honorable David Sam, Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court 
in and for Utah County. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the sentence 
imposed by the Court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Following the acceptance of appellant's plea of 
guilty on November 14, 1978, by Judge Sorensen, time for 
pronouncement of the judgment was set for December 8, 1978, 
and the matter was referred to Adult Probation and Parole 
Department for pre-sentence investigation, pursuant to Ut~ 
Code Ann.§ 76-3-404 (1953, as amended). 
On November 30, 1978, appellant requested the Cou:: 
to order the disclosure of the pre-sentence report. At the 
time set for sentencing, December 8, 197 8, the Court cienied 
appellant's request for disclosure of the report. The 
appellant at that time was committed to the Department of 
corrections for a ninety (90) day evaluation, pursuant to 
-2-
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1953, as amended). 
On March 8, 1979, the appellant appeared for 
se~tencing before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock in the 
t D~strict Court for the Fourth Judicial District in and 
for Utah County. At that time the 90-day diagnostic 
evaluation had been disclosed to the appellant, but access 
to the pre-sentence report had been prohibited. Appellant 
was then sentenced to be incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison for a term not to exceed five years, and to make 
restitution to the victim in the sum of $100.00. 
Appellant was then extradited to the State of 
New York where he was tried for second degree murder of a 
person he had allegedly confessed to killing, which statements 
were taken while appellant was in custody in the State of 
Utah. The New York Court dismissed the jury's guilty verdict 
on :;arch 24, 1980, and entered a verdict of acquittal. 
Appellant was thereafter returned to the Utah State Penitentiary. 
On appeal in this case the Utah Supreme Court 
'". ruled, in State v. Lipsky, 608 P. 2d 1241 (Utah 1980) , that 
the appellant's sentence be set aside and that he be re-
sentenced after the State had disclosed to him the contents 
of the pre-sentence report. After receiving a copy of said 
report and undergoing supplemental psychological analysis, 
aopellant was resentenced to one to five years in the State 
-3-
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Penitentiary on August 29, 1980, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable David 
Same, Judge, presiding. 
this appeal. 
That sentence is the subject of 
ARGUMENT 
Before addressing appellant's points of argument, 
respondent feels that it is necessary to the disposition of 
this appeal to discuss briefly, in more detail, the colloquy 
which transpired on the day appellant was re-sentenced, 
August 29, 1980. At that time appellant's counsel expressec 
concern that reference to the murder charge in New York, 
of which appellant was acquitted, was made in the pre-senten 
report (Transcript of Sentencing, pp.3-5). The reference 
was made in the pre-sentence report in the form of a 
statement by Ms. Betty Davies of the Provo office of the 
Adult Probation and Parole Department to the effect that 
appellant had admitted during an interview at the Utah Stati 
Hospital to having committed a homicide in the State of lib·. 
York. Appellant further named the victim and the location 
of the homicide during his interview with Ms. Davies (Transc 
of Sentencing, p.3). Because of the subsequent acquittal, 
appellant's counsel felt that any mention of that proceeuir, 
including· appellant's reference and admission to the killl 
-4-
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i 
---
ourin9 his interview with the Adult Pr.obation and Parole 
Department, should be stricken from the pre-sentence report 
(Transcript of Sentencing, pp.3-7). The county attorney's 
response to appellant's motion was that the first intelligence 
gained on the subject of the murder charge in New York came 
from appellant's own mouth as he was interviewed by a member 
of the Adult Probation and Parole Department. As such, 
reference made by the appellant himself to the murder charge 
is relevant information and ought to be considered by the 
court. However, the county attorney stated that anything 
concerning the legal or trial aspects of the case in New 
York ought not to be considered by the court and that he 
felt that the court was entirely capable of sifting the 
irrelevant from the relevant (Transcript of Sentencing, p.7). 
In denying appellant's motion for a new pre-sentence 
report o!ilffiiting ap?ellant's statements referring to the New 
~·or:<. !1urder case, Judge Sam stated: 
. . . It does appear to me counsel that any 
matter civen bv the defendant to the Adult 
Probation anc Parole Department is a matter 
that is to be appropriately considered by the 
sentencing court and that matter having been 
oiven it coes appear to me that it is a matter 
that is in the record. I understand Mr. Lipsky 
[appella..~t] that the matter, as counsel has 
accuratelv stated, has gone onto New York, that 
the New Y~rk court has acquitted you, that you 
have in fact been found not guilty by the New 
York court and all of those matters are in my 
documen~ation and have been considered by me. 
-5-
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Now I believe counsel that the matters 
have been given appropriate consideration 
. I understand that pursuant to the 
record that I have that he [appellant] 
made a statement to Betty Davies I believe 
as you have stated. That statement is in 
the file. It has been considered by the 
Court and I understand what has happened 
with that pursuant to the legal requirements 
of the law and those matters are before me 
and have been considered by me. 
Now I believe that they are appropriate 
matters for consideration for what thev are 
worth and I have considered that the S~preme 
Court or the Appellate Court of New York has 
found Mr. Lipsky not guilty. Now these 
matters are all in the file and I have them 
before me and I am giving what weight to 
those matters that I feel should be given 
weight to and the matter before me is the 
matter of the offense here in the State of 
Utah. (Transcript of Sentencing,pp.7-8). 
The court further stated in addressing the appellant: 
Mr. Lipsky, I have given consideration to 
your file. I understand that you have made 
remarkable progress. That you have great 
support from your family. You have support 
from many individuals who have come foward 
and have made statements in your behalf and 
I have considered all of those matters and I 
have given what weight I feel should be given 
to them . (Transcript of Sentencing, p. 9). 
Prior to announcing the sentence, the trial coort 
gave a detailed explanation of the reasoning used to detern: 
appellant's sentence: 
Alright Mr. Lipsky let me advise you of the 
matter that is of most concern to the court. 
I certainly compliment you for the progress that 
apparently you have made. It appears from the 
file that I have that you have made good progress 
-6-
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and ther~ are people who apparently have 
a sreat deal of faith in you and I feel 
that you have been if I might term it such 
a 'model prisoner' which I wish to commend 
you. It appears however to the court that 
the thing that is of most importance in all 
of these reports and I am not just discounting 
those letters of recommendation from your 
family, your loved ones, and people who are 
not maybe in that category who have had contact 
with you in the prison here or in New York 
and it appears that you have done a remarkable 
job, but the one item that is of most concern 
is the update of the psychological report 
which is I believe the thing that the court 
here has been interested in and interested in 
receiving and in getting that update. Now we 
do have an update in the file, dated July 28, 
1980, received July 30, 1980, and it is part 
of the report and it is this report that I 
feel that I have to give considerable weight 
to and emphasis to. This report is signed 
by Richard T. Grow and in essence this is 
what he states in his concluding paragraph: 
'In short we have test data which suggest that 
Leonard is temporarily improved, but not cured. 
Further, there are clear indications that 
Leonard periodically tends to lose proper 
intellectual control over his behavior. On 
such occasions he will display behavior whlch 
is impulsive, egocentered, oppositional and 
devoid of proper judgment.' 
Now !·Ir. Lipsky the thing that of course I am 
concerned about is the interest that we have here 
and I am sure vou understand those. You have your 
interest and "-~ want vou to become rehabilitated 
and I want you to con~inue to proceed and progress 
as vou have and I am pleased from what I read, but 
the-other interests that I must weigh as a sentencing 
judge in this matter is the interest of the public 
in this particular matter. This was a crime, a crime 
of violence which could have resulted in verv verv 
serious consecuences and fortunately it did not go to 
the extent th~t maybe possibly it could have gone, 
but nevertheless the elements were there you see and 
so I must weigh those interests and the thing.that.I 
am concerned about is the update that I have in this 
particular report. Now--
-7-
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MR. LIPSKY: Your Honor, if I may? 
THE COURT: Yes you may. 
MR. LIPSKY: Your Honor, I feel that I have 
gained quite a bit of progress from being in 
the prison situation. I have come to a number 
of realizations about myself. On the other ha~ 
I feel that I have spent as much time growinc "• 
in that particular situation as I possibly c;n 
and perhaps any further delay, any more 
time that I will be doing at the state prison 
could possibly be detrimental and most probably 
will not be helpful. 
THE COURT: I understand Mr. Lipsky and that 
is the risk that I feel that I have to take in 
this matter and as I said to you Mr. Lipsky I 
don't relish having to be the sentencing judge, 
but on the other hand I must not shirt my 
responsibility and I must weigh these matters as 
I feel they should be weighed. Now in all due 
concern to these matters and there being no 
legal reason why judgment should not be 
pronounced at this time and having given 
consideration to the reports as I have seen ther: I 
and what weight I feel I should give them and what 
relevancy I feel should be given to them, it is 
going to be my judgment that you be confined in 
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term 
. I am going to ask or recommend to the pa:o1' 
board that they consider your conduct in this ma::' 
your time that you have served, and that these 
considerations be given to you in any parole 
consideration so that if Mr. Lipsky can be given 
consideration relative to the time he may be 
considered for parole, that I would be happy as 
the sentencing judge to make this observation to 
them by way of letter if you would deem that 
appropriate. 
Transcript of Sentencing, pp. 11-13. 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHO\HNG THJ.l.T THE INFORMATION 
RELIED UPON BY THE LOl<'ER COURT IN SENTENCING 
APPELLANT WAS NOT ACCURATE AND RELIABLE· 
Respondent submits and fully agrees 1·:i th appella,,: 
-8-
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that one convicted of a crime has a right to be sentenced 
on the basis of information that is accurate. State v. 
Lipsl-:y, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, any 
information which may be misleading should not be used by 
a judge without the defendant's knowledge and without 
?roviding him with an opportunity to refute or explain 
such information. State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 
197 8) . 
Appellant has impliedly alleged in Point I of his 
argument that the information used as a basis for his 
sentencing was inaccurate and unreliable. He made no 
specific allegations to substantiate his argument, but 
merely states the law as set forth in the recent case of 
State v. Lipsky, supra, as well as federal law. No specific 
allegations of inaccuracy or unreliability having been set 
~c:-th by appellant in Point I, respondent submits that any 
i~plied allegations of inaccuracy intended by appellant 
:-ec;-crding information upon which his sentence 1-;as based 
~c~ be considered by this Court. 
-9-
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POINT II 
RESENTENCING OF APPELLANT BY THE 
TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER AND BASED 
l1PON INFORMATION WHICH WAS PROPER 
FOR CONSIDERATION 
Appellant alleges that his statements to the 
Adult Probation and Parole Officer regarding the murder 
case in New York and any other reference to that charge 
should not have been considered by the trial court in 
sentencing. His reasoning is that the court has no basis 
for determining whether or not the allegations regarding 
appellant's statements are accurate. His argument also 
seemingly implies that since appellant was acquitted of 
the murder charge, any and all reference to that charge is 
inappropriate in the sentencing process, i.e., the incident 
should be treated as if it never occurred. 
Though this Court has never specifically stated 
that crimes with which an accused has been tried and 
acquitted are not the subject of proper consideration in 
the sentencing process, case and statutory law of this 
State and other jurisdiction either impliedly (as is the 
case in Utah) or specifically approves (as is the case in 
lltah's sister states and federal courts) of the use of 
such information. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1953, as amended), 
-10-
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states in relevant part: 
(1) In felony cases where the court 
is of the opinion that imprisonment may 
be appropriate but desires more detailed 
information as a basis for determining 
the sentence to be imposed than has been 
provided by the pre-sentence report, the 
court may, in its discretion, commit a 
convicted defendant to the custody of the 
division of corrections for a period not 
to exceed ninety days. The division of 
corrections shall conduct a complete 
study of the defendant during that time, 
inquiring into such matters as the 
defendant's previous delinquency or 
criminal experience, his social background, 
his capabilities, his mental, emotional 
and physical health, and the rehabilitative 
resources or programs which may be available 
to suit his needs . . the court, prosecutor, 
and the defendant or his attorney shall be 
provided with a written report of YeSUits 
of the study . (Emphasis added.) 
The legislature, in the wording of the statute, 
does not expressly limit the scope of the diagnostic study 
tc a defendant's criminal convictions, but specifically uses 
the phraseology "defendant's previous deliquency or criminal 
experience." ?. crir:iinal experience can range from arrest 
and subsequent release to arrest and subsequent trial 
proceedings resulting in conviction or acquittal. In State 
,. Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957), this Court, 
in discussing the discretionary powers in the granting or 
denying o~ probation following conviction, stated: 
... The granting or withholding of 
probation involves considering intangibles 
-11-
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of character, personality and attitude, 
of which the cold research aives little 
inkling. These matters, which are to 
be considered in connection with the prior 
record of the accused, . must of 
necessity rest within the discretion of 
the judge . 310 P.2d at 393 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus a criminal experience most definitely includes a 
defendant's prior record. No limitation as to arrests 
which result in subsequent acquittals is placed upon the 
terms "criminal experience" or "prior record" either by 
statute or case law in this State. 
... 
It would seem that the legislature, in its enact· 
ment of § 76-3-404, intented for a sentencing judge to ~w i 
as much reliable information as possible to make a sound 
determination which will both protect the general public's 
interests and at the same time help to rehabilitate the 
defendant. Many sources of information are required from 
which to acquire all the needed information to accomplish 
such a task. As stated in State v. Carson, 597 P. 2d 862, 
864 (Utah 1979) 
it should be noted that the 
sentencing judge's discretion in 
sentencing may be based on several 
sources of information . 
Some of Utah's neighboring states have specific~'. 
ruled that the use of a defendant's record which includes 
-12-
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arrests resulting in acquittals is permissible during the 
sentencing process. State v. Stanley, 123 Ariz. 95, 597 
1J.'.2d 998 (1979). In State v. Kelly, 122 Ariz. 495, 595 
1J.2d 1040 (1979), the Arizona Court of Appeals said: 
In making sentencing decisions, a trial 
court which is vested with discretion as 
to the limits of the sentence may consider 
all information possible about the defendant's 
past conduct. [cites omitted). In performing 
this function, the trial judge is not 
necessarily restricted to considering only 
evidence admissible at trial. [cites omitted). 
This broad discretion to consider all relevant 
information extends even so far as to allow 
consideration of evidence of crimes for which 
the defendant has been charged, tried and 
acquitted [cites omitted). 595 P.2d at 1043, 
1044 (emphasis added). 
-13-
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1 
The courts in the State of Washington have held 
like the Arizona courts. State v. Hernandez, 20 Wash.A~. 
225, 581 P.2d 157 (1978); State v. lVilcox, 20 \'lash.App. 
617, 581 P.2d 596 (1978); State v. Dainard, 85 Wash.2d 
624, 537 P.2d 760 (1975), stand for the proposition that 
an arrest without trial or conviction is a proper matter 
for consideration by the court at sentencing, wherein 
Hernandez and Wilcox follow the factual situation in 
State v. Kelly, supra, i.e., that an arrest aI'.d charge whic' 
result in subsequent trial and acquittal are proper matters 
for consideration of a trial court during sentencing. T~ 
Supreme Court of l\lashington shed some light on its reasoninc 
for allowing consideration during sentencing of criminal 
activities which do not result in convictions. In State 
v. Dainard, supra, the Court said: 
With regard to the question whether the 
court properly considered information regarding 
an arrest upon which no charges were filed, we 
recognize that an arrest, without charge, trial 
and conviction, is not proof of guilt. It is, 
however, evidence that the arresting officer 
considered that he had probable cause to make 
the arrest. The occurrence is one which has 
some relevance to the question before the court 
in a sentencing procedure. 
537 P.2d at 762. 
The Federal Courts have also allowed a trial judge 
to use evidence of prior criminal conduct not resulting in 
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conviction during sentencing proceedings. United States 
v. '1organ, 595 F. 2d 1134 (Ninth Circuit 1979); Ur.ited 
States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147 (Seventh Circuit 
1972); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 1193 (Tenth Circuit 
1977); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Pardons, 541 F.2d 
938 (Second Circuit 1976); United States v. Cardi, 519 
F.2d 309 (Seventh Circuit 1975); United States v. Sweig, 
454 F.2d 181 (Second Cirucit 1972); United States v. Weston, 
448 F. 2d 626 (Ninth Circuit 1971). In United States v. Sweig, 
supra, the sentencing court relied in part upon information 
regarding crimes for which defendant was acquitted. In upholding 
this procedure used by the trial court, the United States Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals said: 
. just as the sentencing judge may 
rely upon information as to crimes with which 
the defendant has been charged but not tried, 
so here the judge could properly refer 
to the evidence introduced with respect to 
crimes of which defendant ~as acquitted. 
Acquittal does not have the effect of 
conclusively establishing the untruth of all 
evidence introduced against the defendant. 
For all that appears in the record of the 
present case, the jury may have believed all 
such evidence to be true, but have found that 
some essential element of the charge was not 
proved. 
-'54 F. 2d at 184. 
Many of the Federal cases heretofore mentioned 
involve Rule 32 (c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. That rule provides: 
The report of the presentence investigatio 
shall contain any prior criminal record of t~ n 
defendant and such information about his 
characteristics, his financial condition and 
the circumstances affecting his behavior 
as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in 
granting probation or in the correctional 
treatment of the defendant, and other such 
information as may be required by the court. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
Respondent would also point out that 18 U. S.C.A. 
§ 3577, enacted in 1970, which places few limitations on 
the information a sentencing federal judge has access to, 
1 has not been repealed or amended in any way by Congress. 
It was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 
L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). The court held that as a general rule, 
a federal district judge may, before sentencing, ". 
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlirni ted eithe: 
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the sourc· 
from which it may come." 404 U.S. at 446. The court did, 
1 18 u.s.C.A. § 3577, reads: "No limitation shall be pla 
on the information concerning the background, charac~: 
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which 
a court of the United States may receive and consider 
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 
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however, recognize one well-defined limitation to the rule, 
i.e., use or consideration of convictions obtained when 
the defendant was not afforded the benefit of counsel. 
The United States Supreme Court, in lhlliarns v. 
People of the State of New York, 337 U.S. 241 at 247, 69 
s. Ct. 1079 at 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1760 (1949), stated the duties 
of the trial judge regarding sentencing: 
.A sentencing judge . is not 
confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His 
task within fixed statutory or constitutional 
limits is to determine the type and extent 
of punishment after the issue of guilt has 
been determined. Highly relevant--if not 
essential--to his selection of an appropriate 
sentence is the possession of the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant's 
life and characteristics. 
The federal cases are cited to emphasize the 
analogous situations that state and federal judges find 
themselves in when trying to obtain all information possible 
that will be helpful in fitting the punishment to the defendant 
as well as the crime. 
In the instant case, the central issues is whether 
Judge Sam abused his discretionary powers in sentencing 
appellant to zero to five years in the state penitentiary. 
I~ State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978), this Court 
sLated, in quoting from Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 
19 7 5) : 
-17-
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. a judgment in a criminal case 
will not be disturbed because of sentencing 
procedures unless there is a showing of an abu" 
of discretion, procedural conduct pre-judicial " 
to defendant, circumstances which manifest 
inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct 
which offends the public sense of fair play 
Id. at 7 51. The Utah Supreme Court then proceeded in its 
opinion to set down the test for ascertaining whether a 
trial judge abused his discretion: 
Before this Court will overturn the 
sentence given by the trial court, it must 
be clear that the actions of the judge 
were so inherently unfair as to constitute 
abuse of discretion. 
In State v. Harris, 10 Wash.App. 509, 
518 P.2d 237 (1974), the court there said 
that the exercise of discretion in sentencing 
necessarily reflects the personal judgment 
of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said 
that no reasonable man would take the view 
adopted by the trial court. 
Whether or not the trial judge changed 
his mind due to the conduct of the defendant 
or to other reasons is not our concern. The 
sentence imposed. . was the proper statutory 
penalty for the offense . . and this Court 
will not reverse or modify a sentence prescrib~ 
by law unelss it is clearly excessive or unless 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
584 P.2d at 887, 888. 
In the present case, the sentence was the proper 
statutory penalty £or the offense. Appellant was convicU 
of aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (1953), as amended. Aggravated assault being a 
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felony cf the third degree, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203 and 
/7-35-20 (1953), as amended, provide for a term of imprison-
".'Ent "~1ot to exceed five years." Of course, other sentencing 
alternatives are available pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
/6-3-201 (1953), as amended. Thus, Judge Sam was completely 
within his limits in imposing the prison term. 
It cannot be said that given the information 
available to Judge Sam, that no reasonable man would take 
the view adopted by the trial court. The report submitted 
to the court stated that "there are clear indications that 
[appellant) periodically tends to lose proper intellectual 
control over his behavior. On such occasions he will display 
behavior which is impulsive, ego centered, oppositional and 
ci.evoid o:: proper judgment." The appellant had already 
assaulted a young lady in Provo. He admitted to having 
co;rciitted a homicide in l'iew York, though he was acquitted. 
Co~Dled with the diagnostic evaluation, it seems readily 
apparent that the interests of appellant and society were 
2est served by further con=inement in the penitentiary 
until such time as the Board of Pardons would consider the 
case. 
POil\'T III 
THE FO?\i?.RDING OF THE REPORT OF THE ADULT 
PROB.11.TION AND PJ..ROLE DEPJ..RTF.ENT TO THE 
PAROLE BOARD DID NOT UNJUSTLY LENGTHEN 
?.PPELLAI\"T' S TERI'i OF IMPRISONMENT. 
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Appellant alleges that the forwarding of the 
report about him prepared by the Adult Probation and 
r 
Parole Department to the Board of Pardons has operated to 
lengthen his stay in prison. 2 The Board of Pardons had no, 
met on appellant's case, thus any reasons for denial of 
probation at this point in time are purely speculative a~ 
not subject to appeal. Respondent submits that since the 
trial court has such wide latitude in concidering all 
matters bearing upon the personal history and behavior of 
the appellant, including matters for which he had been trie: 
and acquitted, the Board of Pardons, which is concerned ritl 
2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-8 (c) (1953), as amended, compel: 
the trial court to forward information he has regardin~ 
various aspects of appellant's sentence: 
In cases where an indeterminate 
sentence is imposed, the judge imposing the 
sentence and the state's attorney prosecuting 
the case must each, within 30 days from the 
date of such sentence, mail to the executive 
secretary of the board of pardons a statement 
in writing setting out the terms for which, 
in their respective opinions, the prisoner 
so sentencec ought to be imprisoned, together 
with any information they may have regarding 
the character of the prisoner or anv mitigating 
or aggravating circum~tances connected with the 
offense for which the prisoner has been 
convicted, and any other information that 
will aid the board of pardons in passing upon 
the application for the termination or commuta-
tion of such sentence, or for parole or pardon. 
Such statements shall be presented to the board 
of pardons at the next regular meeting of the 
board, and shall be preserved in the files of 
the board. 
-20-
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all facets of a prisoner's character, nake-up and behavior, 
is, a fortiori, entitled to be fully advised of the 
co~tents of the presentence report. Billiteri v. United 
States Boe.rd of Parole, 541 ~- 2d 938 (Second Circuit 1976). 
Thus appellant can claim no error on behalf of the Board 
of Pardons in not having granted the appellant his parole, 
since they (the Board of Pardons) are considering the 
sru.ie information as the trial judge considered. 
The allegations of appellant regarding the Board 
of Pardons are strictly conjectural and have no foundation 
or basis for appeal and should thusly not be considered. 
CONCLUSIO'.~ 
The appellant has not stated a claim on which 
this Court can find as a matter of law that the trial court 
c.bused its discretion in considering t..he confession by appellant 
:n -che presentence report. Nor has appellant shown that the 
-cric.l ~udge abused his discretion in sentencing appellant to the 
penitentiary for the term provided by law. The claim that the 
::o,-.,,-c.rC:ing cf t'.-:e report of the ;;dult Probation and Parole 
:;ep=.rtr.er_ t to -che Pc.role Board lenghtened appellant's sentence 
:s unfounded and ~as nc basis in -chis appeal. Respondent 
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therefore respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
sentence of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to Mr. w. Andrew McCullough, Attorney for 
Appellant, 
84057, this 
930 South State Street, Suite 10, Orem, Utah 
1zv day of June, 1981. 
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